Abstract-Remote data integrity checking is a crucial technology in cloud computing. Recently, many works focus on providing data dynamics and/or public verifiability to this type of protocols. Existing protocols can support both features with the help of a third-party auditor. In a previous work, Sebé et al. [1] propose a remote data integrity checking protocol that supports data dynamics. In this paper, we adapt Sebé et al.'s protocol to support public verifiability. The proposed protocol supports public verifiability without help of a third-party auditor. In addition, the proposed protocol does not leak any private information to third-party verifiers. Through a formal analysis, we show the correctness and security of the protocol. After that, through theoretical analysis and experimental results, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol has a good performance.
, [13] , [14] , [15] support public verifiability, by which anyone (not just the client) can perform the integrity checking operation. The protocols in [9] , [13] , [14] , [15] support privacy against third-party verifiers. We compare the proposed protocol with selected previous protocols (see Table 1 ).
In this paper, we have the following main contributions:
. We propose a remote data integrity checking protocol for cloud storage, which can be viewed as an adaptation of Sebé et al.'s protocol [1] . The proposed protocol inherits the support of data dynamics from [1] , and supports public verifiability and privacy against third-party verifiers, while at the same time it doesn't need to use a third-party auditor. .
We give a security analysis of the proposed protocol, which shows that it is secure against the untrusted server and private against third-party verifiers. .
We have theoretically analyzed and experimentally tested the efficiency of the protocol. Both theoretical and experimental results demonstrate that our protocol is efficient. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, technical preliminaries are presented. In Section 3, the proposed remote data integrity checking protocol is presented. In Section 4, a formal analysis of the proposed protocol is presented. In Section 5, we describe the support of data dynamics of the proposed protocol. In Section 6, the protocol's complexity is analyzed in the aspects of communication, computation, and storage costs; furthermore, experimental results are presented for the efficiency of the protocol. And finally, conclusions and possible future work are presented in Section 7.
TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
We consider a cloud storage system in which there are a client and an untrusted server. The client stores her data in the server without keeping a local copy. Hence, it is of critical importance that the client should be able to verify the integrity of the data stored in the remote untrusted server. If the server modifies any part of the client's data, the client should be able to detect it; furthermore, any third-party verifier should also be able to detect it. In case a thirdparty verifier verifies the integrity of the client's data, the data should be kept private against the third-party verifier. Below we present a formal statement of the problem.
Problem formulation. Denote by m the file that will be stored in the untrusted server, which is divided into n blocks of equal lengths: m ¼ m 1 m 2 . . . m n , where n ¼ djmj=le. Here, l is the length of each file block. Denote by f K ðÁÞ a pseudo-random function which is defined as f : f0; 1g k Â f0; 1g log 2 ðnÞ ! f0; 1g d ;
in which k and d are two security parameters. Furthermore, denote the length of N in bits by jNj. We need to design a remote data integrity checking protocol that includes the following five functions: SetUp, TagGen, Challenge, GenProof, and CheckProof. SetUpð1 k Þ ! ðpk; skÞ. Given the security parameter k, this function generates the public key pk and the secret key sk. pk is public to everyone, while sk is kept secret by the client.
TagGenðpk; sk; mÞ ! D m . Given pk, sk and m, this function computes a verification tag D m and makes it publicly known to everyone. This tag will be used for public verification of data integrity. Challengeðpk; D m Þ ! chal. Using this function, the verifier generates a challenge chal to request for the integrity proof of file m. The verifier sends chal to the server.
GenProofðpk; D m ; m; chalÞ ! R. Using this function, the server computes a response R to the challenge chal. The server sends R back to the verifier.
CheckProofðpk; D m ; chal; RÞ ! f''success;''''failure''g. The verifier checks the validity of the response R. If it is valid, the function outputs "success," otherwise the function outputs "failure." The secret key sk is not needed in the CheckProof function.
Security requirements. There are two security requirements for the remote data integrity checking protocol: security against the server with public verifiability, and privacy against third-party verifiers. We first give the definition of security against the server with public verifiability. In this definition, we have two entities: a challenger that stands for either the client or any third-party verifier, and an adversary that stands for the untrusted server.
Definition 1 (Security against the Server with Public Verifiability [3] ). We consider a game between a challenger and an adversary that has four phases: Setup, Query, Challenge, and Forge. Forge. The adversary computes a response R to prove the integrity of the requested file blocks. If CheckProofðpk; D m ; chal; RÞ ¼ ''success; '' then the adversary has won the game. The remote data integrity checking protocol is said to be secure against the server if for any PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary A, the probability that A wins the game on a collection of file blocks is negligibly close to the probability that the challenger can extract these file blocks by a knowledge extractor E. When the verifier is not the client herself, the protocol must ensure that no private information about the client's data is leaked to the third-party verifier. We formalize this requirement using the simulation paradigm [16] .
Before we proceed to the definition of this requirement, we introduce some related notations. Let f ¼ ðf 1 ; f 2 Þ be a PPT functionality and let Å be a two-party protocol for computing f. During the execution of Å, denote the view of the first (resp., second) party by view t Þ) where r 1 (resp., r 2 ) represents the outcome of the first (resp., second) party's internal coin tosses, and m 1 i (resp., m 2 i ) represents the ith message it has received. Denote the output of the first (resp., second) party during the execution of Å on ðx; yÞ by output Å 1 ðx; yÞ (resp., output Å 2 ðx; yÞ), which is implicit in the party's own view of the execution. We denote the verifier and the server by V and P, respectively. Definition 2 (Privacy against Semihonest Behavior [16] Note that c denotes computational indistinguishability.
From Definition 2, we define the privacy against third-party verifiers, which is given in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Privacy against Third-Party Verifiers). For the remote data integrity checking protocol Å, if there exists a PPT simulator S V such that 
then Å is a protocol that ensures privacy against third-party verifiers.
Data dynamics at block level. Data dynamics means after clients store their data at the remote server, they can dynamically update their data at later times. At the block level, the main operations are block insertion, block modification, and block deletion. Moreover, when data is updated, the verification metadata also needs to be updated. The updating overhead should be made as small as possible.
Homomorphic verifiable tags. In our construction, we use a RSA-based homomorphic verifiable tags (HVT) [3] , which is defined as follows: let N ¼ pq be one publicly known RSA modulus. We know that fe : e 2 Z Z N and gcdðe; NÞ ¼ 1g forms a multiplicative group. Denote this group by Z Z 
THE PROPOSED REMOTE DATA INTEGRITY CHECKING PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the proposed remote data integrity checking protocol. Just as formulated in Section 2, the proposed protocol has functions SetUp, TagGen, Challenge, GenProof, and CheckProof, as well as functions for data dynamics. In the following we present the former five functions of the proposed protocol. We leave the functions for data dynamics to Section 5. SetUp ð1 k Þ ! ðpk; skÞ. Let N ¼ pq be one publicly known RSA modulus, in which p ¼ 2p 0 þ 1; q ¼ 2q 0 þ 1 are two large primes. p 0 and q 0 are also primes. In addition, all the quadratic residues modulo N form a multiplicative cyclic group, which we denote by QR N . Denote the generator of QR N by g.
1 Since the order of QR N is p 0 q 0 , the order of g is also p 0 q 0 . Let pk ¼ ðN; gÞ and sk ¼ ðp; qÞ. pk is then released to be publicly known to everyone, and sk is kept secret by the client.
TagGenðpk; sk; mÞ ! D m . For each file block m i ; i 2 ½1; n, the client computes the block tag as
Without loss of generality, we assume that each block is unique. If in some particular applications, there exist blocks with the same value, then we differentiate them by adding a random number
. . . ; D n g. After finishing computing all the block tags, the client sends the file m to the remote server, and releases D m to be publicly known to everyone. Challengeðpk; D m Þ ! chal. In order to verify the integrity of the file m, the verifier generates a random key r 2 ½1; 2 k À 1 and a random group element s 2 Z Z N nf0g. The verifier then computes g s ¼ g s mod N and sends chal ¼ hr; g s i to the server. GenProof ðpk; D m ; m; chalÞ ! R. When the server receives chal ¼ hr; g s i, it generates a sequence of block indexes a 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n by calling f r ðiÞ for i 2 ½1; n iteratively. Then, the server computes
aimi mod N;
and sends R to the verifier. CheckProofðpk; D m ; chal; RÞ ! f''success;''''failure''g. When the verifier receives R from the server, she computes fa i g i¼1;...;n as the server does in the GenProof step. Then, the verifier computes P and R 0 as follows:
After that the verifier checks whether R 0 ¼ R. If R 0 ¼ R, output "success." Otherwise the verification fails and the verifier outputs "failure."
Note that in the TagGen function, we make all the blocks distinct by adding random numbers in blocks with the same value. If the server still tries to save its storage space, then the only way is by breaking the prime factorization of N, or equally, getting a multiple of ðNÞ. The hardness of breaking large number factorization makes the proposed protocol secure against the untrusted server. We put the formal analysis of the proposed protocol in Section 4.
CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show that the proposed protocol is correct in the sense that the server can pass the verification of data integrity as long as both the client and the server are honest. Then we show that the protocol is secure against the untrusted server. These two theorems together guarantee that, assuming the client is honest, if and only if the server has access to the complete and uncorrupted data, it can pass the verification process successfully. Finally, we show that the proposed protocol is private against third-party verifiers. Proof. We prove this theorem by showing that R and R 0 should be equal if all the data blocks are kept completely at the server. From the TagGenðmÞ function, we get that D i ¼ ðg mi Þ mod N; i 2 ½1; n. Then, we get
aimi mod N:
Then,
This completes the proof. t u
Before we proceed to Theorem 2, we first review the KEA1-r assumption, which has been investigated in [17] , [18] , and adapted to the RSA setting in [3] .
Definition 4 KEA1-r(Knowledge of Exponent Assumption [3]).
For any adversary A taking input ðN; g; g s Þ and returning ðC; Y Þ with Y ¼ C s , there exists "extractor" " A, which given the same input as A returns c such that C ¼ g c .
Our proof of Theorem 2 needs a lemma from [19] on solving prime factorization when a multiple of 0 ðnÞ is known. Denote the prime factorization of N by p 1 v1 . . . p t vt . Then, 0 ðnÞ ¼ lcm ðp 1 À 1; . . . ; p t À 1Þ, in which lcm denotes least common multiple.
Lemma 1 [19] . Let g be any function that satisfies the following two conditions: 1) 0 ðnÞjgðnÞ, 2) jgðnÞj ¼ Oðjnj k Þ for some constant k.
Then "prime factorization" is polynomial time reducible to g. Furthermore, the cost of solving the prime factorization of n is Oðjnj kþ4 MðjnjÞÞ, in which MðjnjÞ denotes the cost of multiplying two integers of binary length jnj. Theorem 2. Under the KEA1-r and the large integer factorization assumptions, the proposed protocol is secure against the untrusted server.
Proof. Just as in the security formulation, we denote the adversary by A and the challenger by B. What we want to prove is that for any PPT adversary who wins the data possession game on some file blocks, the challenger can construct a knowledge extractor E that extracts these file blocks. Equivalently, if E cannot extract these file blocks, the challenger can break the integer factorization problem.
For the large integer factorization problem, B is given a large integer N, which is product of two large primes p and q. Here, p ¼ 2p 0 þ 1 and q ¼ 2q 0 þ 1. B tries to solve the prime factorization of N.
B simulates the protocol environment for A with the following steps:
. aimi mod N from D m , P is also treated as A's output.
So A is given ðN; g; g s Þ as input, and outputs ðR; P Þ that satisfies R ¼ P s . From the KEA1-r assumption, B can construct an extractor " A, which given the same input as A, outputs c which satisfies P ¼ g c mod N.
aimi mod N, B extracts c ¼ P n i¼1 a i m i mod p 0 q 0 . Now B generates n challenges hr 1 ; g s1 i, hr 2 ; g s2 i . . . ; hr n ; g sn i using the method described in Section 3. B computes a j i ¼ f rj ðiÞ for i 2 ½1; n and j 2 ½1; n. Because fr 1 ; r 2 ; . . . ; r n g are chosen by B, now B chooses them so that fa 
Here det½Á denotes the determinant of a matrix. B challenges A for n times. On the jth time, B challenges A with fr j ; g sj g.
From the response of A, B extracts c j ¼ a (1) holds, the following system of linear equations has a unique solution.
. . . 4 MðjNjÞÞ. Because A is a PPT adversary, the length of k 1 is bounded by OðjNj k2 Þ for some constant k 2 . From the above we can see that if any file block cannot be extracted, then B can construct a knowledge extractor E to extract the prime factorization of N in probabilistic polynomial time.
In conclusion, under the KEA1-r and large integer factorization assumptions, the proposed protocol guarantees the data integrity against an untrusted server. t u Theorem 3 (Privacy against Third-Party Verifiers). Under the semihonest model [16] , a third party verifier cannot get any information about the client's data m from the protocol execution. Hence, the protocol is private against third-party verifiers.
Proof. (Sketch) In this proof, we construct a simulator for the view of the verifier, and show that the output of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable with the view of the verifier. Due to space limitation, we put the detailed proof in the full version of this paper [20] . t u
DATA DYNAMICS
The proposed protocol supports data dynamics at the block level in the same way as [1] . In the following, we show how our protocol supports block modification. Due to space limitation, we describe the support of block insertion and block deletion in the full version [20] . From the above we can see that the correspondence relationship between the block and the digest does not change after the data updating, i.e., D i ¼ g mi mod N; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; djmj=le. So, the data integrity is still protected. If the client wants to make sure that the file has really been updated, she can launch a proof request immediately by sending a challenge to the server. Any block that is updated is given a novel random number, so that each block remains unique. Therefore, the server cannot delete any block without being detected.
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present a complexity analysis of the communication, computation, and storage costs of the proposed protocol. After that, we present the experimental results.
Communication, Computation, and Storage Costs
The communication, computation, and storage costs of the client, the server and the verifier are analyzed and shown in Table 2 . The detailed analyses are omitted due to space limitation. Interested readers can refer to [20] for them. For the data dynamics, the computation cost for block insertion or block modification is just one modular exponentiation, which is T exp ðjNj; NÞ.
Storage of the block tags. Because the n block tags D 1 ; D 2 ; . . . ; D n are made publicly known to everyone, they can be stored at the server, the client or the verifier. If the tags are stored at the server, then traditional integrity protection methods such as digital signatures can be used to protect them from being tampered with by the server. The storage cost of the block tags is upper bounded by djmj=lejNj bits. In this case, when the data integrity checking is performed, the tags are transmitted back to the verifier from the server. As the tags have been signed by the client's private key, the server cannot tamper with them. This will incur communication costs that are linear to the number of blocks. However, because the tags are relatively small compared with the original data, the incurred communication costs are acceptable with respect to all the good features the proposed protocol has. If the tags are stored at the verifier or the client, then these communication costs are mitigated. However, this will cause a storage cost of OðnÞ at the verifier or the client, which is the same as Sebé et al.'s protocol [1] .
Experimental Results
In the experiment, we measure the computation costs at the verifier and the server when the file length is fixed and the block size is changed. The results are shown in Table 3 . After that, we measure the computation costs when the file length changes and the block size is fixed. The results are shown in Table 4 . We also measure the client's preprocessing costs, which are shown in Table 5 . We choose k ¼ d ¼ 128. The proposed protocol is implemented on a laptop with Intel Core2 Duo 2.00 GHz CPU and 1.99 GB memory. All the programs are written in the C++ language with the assistance of MIRACL library [21] .
From Table 3 we can see that when the file length is 2 25 bits (4 MB) and the block size is 2 18 bits (32 KB), the computation cost at the verifier is 173.39 ms, and the computation cost at the server is 2304.39 ms.
From Table 4 , we can see that the computation cost at the server does not increase much when the file length increases. But the computation cost at the verifier increases nearly proportionally with the increasing file length. We note that this is consistent with the theoretical analysis in Section 6.1. When the file length increases, the times of exponential operations at the verifier increase proportionally. However, the server performs only one exponential operation no matter how large the file is. Therefore, the server's burden is not increased much with larger files. As to the verifier's load, our scheme can be efficient when the file length is not huge. However, when the file length is very large, our protocol can be easily extended into a probabilistic one by using the probabilistic framework proposed in [3] . In that case, the extended protocol provides probabilistic data possession guarantee while its other good features are still kept.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a new remote data integrity checking protocol for cloud storage. The proposed protocol is suitable for providing integrity protection of customers' important data. The proposed protocol supports data insertion, modification, and deletion at the block level, and also supports public verifiability. The proposed protocol is proved to be secure against an untrusted server. It is also private against third-party verifiers. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed protocol has very good efficiency in the aspects of communication, computation, and storage costs.
Currently, we are still working on extending the protocol to support data level dynamics. The difficulty is that there is no clear mapping relationship between the data and the tags. In the current construction, data level dynamics can be supported by using block level dynamics. Whenever a piece of data is modified, the corresponding blocks and tags are updated. However, this can bring unnecessary computation and communication costs. We aim to achieve data level dynamics at minimal costs in our future work. 
